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Now that the presidential campaign of 2008 has been over for more than a month, it is possible 
to begin to get some perspective on that extraordinary election. All presidential elections are 
different and, almost by definition, historic, but this one was particularly groundbreaking, not 
just because of Obama's victory but because it forces us to rethink many of our assumptions 
about presidential elections. Many of the things that strategists, pundits and other observers knew 
about presidential elections were proven wrong during the last twelve months. 
First, and most obviously, the 2008 election obviously proves wrong any notions that America 
was not ready for a non-white president. Obama's election will put an end to that line of fruitless, 
self-defeating and occasionally racist thinking. There are still other barriers that need to come 
down with regards to the presidency. For example, Obama's victory meant that we did not get 
our first woman president, but Clinton's campaign, although not successful, on balance, probably 
moved us closer to electing a woman president. Obama's victory also opens the doors for other 
non-white candidates, from both parties. 
The Republican Party clearly should rethink a few things after this election as well. Actually, 
they should probably rethink many things, but for reasons of space, I will focus on one-the 
relative strength and import of the socially conservative wing of the party, which has been its 
electoral base for decades. If 2008 was not a good year for the Republican Party, it was an even 
worse year for the Republican base. First, after a brief and not intensely competitive primary 
season, the party nominated a candidate who was uniquely, if inexplicably, disliked by the 
party's socially conservative and evangelical base. The ease with which McCain won his party's 
election is evidence that the strength of social conservatives, even within the party, was probably 
overstated. After seeing their party nominate a candidate with no organic connection whatsoever 
to the base, those voters got another chance to show their strength when McCain decided, 
undoubtedly due at least somewhat to pressure from his party's conservative base, to nominate 
Sarah Palin who was extremely popular among these voters. The Palin nomination may not have 
cost McCain the election, but it clearly didn't help. Thus the base first demonstrated that it was 
not strong enough to exercise de facto veto power in a nominating process, and later had it 
demonstrated that their views and positions were essentially anathema to the broader electorate. 
Serious Republican strategists will be wise to focus more on expanding the party's appeal and 
worrying less about the base. 
Some Democratic Party strategic assumptions were similarly challenged this year. For decades it 
has been taken as an absolute given that a successful Democratic ticket must have regional 
diversity. This was a polite way of saying that it must have at least one moderate southerner on 
the ticket. Since 1944, the only years when the Democrats did not have a southerner or 
somebody from a border state on the ticket were 1968 and 1984. They lost both these elections. 
In 2008, the party nominated a ticket with two northern liberals, but still won a decisive victory. 
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This certainly shakes up one of the basic assumptions upon which the Democratic Party has 
based its strategy for a generation. Interestingly, this all northeastern ticket won three states and 
55 electoral votes in the south indicating that there is more than one way to win in the south and 
that the south, like the rest of the country, is changing. 
In general, the 2008 election proved that neither party really has a template for electability 
anymore. In previous decades, those Democrats who were interested in electability tended to 
support primary candidates who were southern, preferably governors and moderate on social 
issues. The prototype for this was, of course, Bill Clinton. While these types of candidates were 
not always able to win the nomination, they were always seen as the most electable by party 
insiders. By this criterion the most electable candidate in 2008 was John Edwards, who finished 
third in the primaries, before being rocked by a scandal that would have most likely cost him the 
election had he been the nominee. 
For the Republicans, the notion of electability was never quite as clear, but generally Republican 
candidates needed to have a socially conservative record, but a personal style that somehow 
made them seem moderate. Reagan, and Bush in 2000, best fit that template. McCain seemed to 
be cut from a similarly electable cloth, but even though on balance he may have done about as 
well as could be expected by a Republican, it is unlikely that many Republican insiders will 
continue to seek out candidates like him. 
After 2008, we no longer know what electability means for either party. The Democrats 
succeeded with two northern liberals, one of whom was African American while John McCain 
made it clear that gruff but occasionally likeable tough guys are no longer enough for the 
Republican Party, but his primary victory also indicates that Repubilcan nominating processes 
may be more open than we have thought. This recent election showed us that many old 
assumptions about presidential elections are wrong, figuring out the new assumptions, and the 
new political world in which we are living, will be essential to the future success of both parties. 
